Pennsylvania Juvenile Defenders: Essential Case Law

Essential Case Law

Commonwealth v. Wertelet 696 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super 1997)
Opinion by Brosky, J. Dissenting opinion by Cavanaugh, J.
Not all instances of resisting arrest amount to aggravated assault.

Defendant resisted attempts to be placed in custody by struggling with the police and kicking one of the troopers in the shin. Although the trooper claimed that the pain he felt from the kicks was “substantial,” his injury did not require medical treatment, and he was able to work the rest of his shift.

The Court held that the trooper’s injury did not amount to “bodily injury” as required by 18 P.a.C.S. § 2702(a)(3). “Bodily injury” is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” The Court reasoned that an occurrence that does “not seriously interrupt one’s daily life” does not amount to bodily injury. In addition, the Court stated that “there is really no justification apart from overzealousness to apply the [aggravated assault] section so as to subsume the crime of resisting arrest and/or other lesser offenses.”

Commonwealth v. Neely 561 A.2d 1 (PA 1989)
Opinion by Larsen, J. Dissenting opinion by Flaherty, J.
Evidence of good character may by itself raise reasonable doubt.

Evidence of good character may by itself raise a reasonable doubt of guilt and justify a verdict of not guilty. Quoting Commonwealth v. Cleary, the Court reiterated its reasoning that “[o]f what avail is a good character, which a man may have been a lifetime in acquiring, if it is to benefit him nothing in his hour of peril?” Id. 19 A. at 1018 (1890).

In re: D.B. 820 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. 2003)
Opinion by Del Sole, P.J.
Defendant’s claim that informant’s testimony may exonerate him met initial defense burden at Motion to Reveal Confidential Informant.

Police officer gave pre-recorded buy money to a confidential informant. The officer testified that from about fifty feet away he watched the informant approach D.B. and buy drugs. The informant returned to the officer with two bags of crack. D.B. was arrested right away with the pre-recorded buy money. No one other than the officer and the informant saw the transaction. D.B. claimed that he was misidentified as the perpetrator by the officer and that the informant would corroborate D.B.’s version of events.

The Court held that where the confidential informant was the only witness to the drug transaction other than a police officer and the defense was misidentification, the trial court erred in finding that the identity of the confidential informant was not both material to the defense and reasonable. The Court reasoned that “there is a reasonable possibility that the confidential informant could provide evidence that would exonerate” D.B. and therefore, “the possible significance of the informant’s testimony cannot be underestimated.” The case was remanded to perform the Carter balancing test.

Commonwealth v. Thompson 779 A.2d 1195 (Pa. Super. 2001)
Opinion by Popovich, J. Dissenting opinion by Joyce, J.
Evidence of other party’s criminal contacts are admissible regarding defense’s constructive possession argument.

Police in Williamsport pulled over a car because of an expired inspection sticker. Defendant was in the rear driver’s side seat. The driver, Jamal Bennett, was arrested on an outstanding warrant. Defendant was released by police. Police found a small bag of marijuana in the middle of the backseat. They radioed a description of the defendant so they could arrest him for the marijuana. Upon arrest, the defendant had a bag of marijuana, fifty-four dollars, and a pager on his person. He told police that the marijuana in the car was his and that they would find more in the car. While executing a search warrant on the car, the police recovered three or four more bags of marijuana and thirty-one straws of cocaine in the backseat area. Defendant was charged with possession of all of the drugs. He was found guilty and sentenced to two to five years plus one year probation. At trial, the defendant sought to present evidence of Jamal Bennett’s prior involvement with cocaine trafficking, specifically, a guilty plea to PWID cocaine and three open counts of PWID cocaine. The trial court allowed in one count and refused to allow the three other counts because of they were not proximate in time, and therefore were lacking in probative value.

Superior Court held that all of the evidence of the Jamal Bennett’s prior cocaine trafficking was relevant to his possible constructive possession of the cocaine found in his car, and the probative value of that evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing of issues, or misleading the jury. The Court found that since Jamal Bennett was not on trial, the danger of unfair prejudice was minimized. Reversed and remanded for new trial.

Commonwealth v. Lovette 450 A.2d 975 (PA 1982)
Opinion by Nix, J.
Without probable cause to arrest, the police may not transport a suspect for identification by a witness.

Perpetrators burglarized a house and left a trail of muddy footprints. Three males one and a half blocks away had mud on their shoes. Defendant had a bag in his hand. The males did not attempt to flee. Defendant showed police that he had a hat in the bag. When asked about his muddy shoes, defendant replied that he must have walked through a muddy field. (There were many dirt lots in the area.) The officer transported the group in the police car to the burglarized home for a possible identification from the complaining witness. Before being placed in the police car, a pat down of the defendant’s companion revealed items that the complaining witness later identified as being taken from his home. After being taken to the complainant, the males were arrested and charged. At trial, the defendant was found guilty of burglary and theft.

The issue raised on appeal was whether patting down the defendant and then placing him in a police car and transporting him to the burglary constituted an arrest. The Commonwealth and the Superior Court agreed that there was not probable cause to arrest the defendant until the items found on the group had been identified by the complainant. The Court defined arrest as “any act that indicates an intention to take the person into custody and subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.” The Court found that in this instance there was an unlawful arrest without probable cause. In order to comply with the perimeters of the Fourth Amendment, the police should have detained the three males and brought the complainant to them for possible identification. In the alternative, the items in question could have been taken to the complainant for possible identification.

The conclusion is that in the absence of probable cause for arrest, the police may not remove the suspect from one location to the scene of the crime for identification purposes. (Unless there are exigent circumstances. See Comm v. Revere, 888 A.2d 694 (Pa. 2005)).

Commonwealth v. Dunlap 2007 Pa. LEXIS 2932
Opinion by Baldwin, J. Concurring opinion by Saylor, Cappy, Fitzgerald, JJ. Dissenting opinion by Castille and Eakin, JJ.
A single, isolated transaction in a high crime area does not give rise to probable cause.

A trained police officer working in a high-crime neighborhood observed defendant and another individual exchange currency for an unknown object without seeing any other suspicious activity. Shortly thereafter, defendant was arrested and searched without a warrant.

The PA Supreme Court reaffirmed Commonwealth v. Banks, 658 A.2d 752 (PA 1995) and found that probable cause found lacking. An officer’s training and experience is not a separate factor for purposes of the totality of the circumstances test. It is only an aid in assessing other factors; rather it is a “lens” through which courts view the quantum of evidence observed at the scene. A court cannot simply conclude that probable cause existed based upon nothing more than the number of years an officer has spent on the force. Rather, the officer must demonstrate a nexus between his experience and the search, arrest, or seizure of evidence.

Commonwealth v. Jackson 548 A.2d 484 (PA 1997)
Opinion by Cappy, J. Dissenting opinion by Newman and Castille, JJ.
Anonymous information about a man with a gun, with no further police corroboration of criminal activity, does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.

In this case, the police received a tip that a man in a green jacket carried a gun and the location of the male (and nothing more). The police went to the location and saw a male (defendant) with a green jacket. The officer immediately frisked the defendant for weapons and found none. During the frisk, a key box fell from the defendant’s person. The police opened it and found cocaine. Defendant was arrested and later convicted of possession of cocaine.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the contents of the initial tip did not contain enough information to constitute reasonable suspicion. It was necessary for the police to corroborate something other than innocent facts- such as a description of clothing and location. This type of information, if uncorroborated, does not even establish reasonable suspicion for a stop & frisk, even if it involves a “man with gun” tip. The Court reiterates its holding in Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068 (1997) that “something more is needed to corroborate the caller’s allegations of criminal conduct.”

Commonwealth v. Martinez 588 A.2d 513 (1991)
Opinion by Johnson, J. Dissenting opinion by Cerrone, J.
The “armed & dangerous” factor does not enter the reasonable suspicion calculus until after the determination of whether or not criminal activity was afoot.

Defendant was talking to a group of people at midnight on a street corner. Police approached and the defendant quickly walked away while holding her hands in front of her coat. Police saw a bulge in her pocket and thought she may have a weapon. Police commanded that she stop. As the defendant leaned over the police car, drugs fell out of her coat.

The Court held that unusual behavior not indicative of criminal activity and reasonable suspicion to believe a person is armed cannot justify a stop when police otherwise lack reasonable suspicion to believe that s/he is involved in criminal activity. The “armed & dangerous” factor does not enter the reasonable suspicion calculus until after the determination of whether or not criminal activity was afoot. Since the initial stop was invalid, the drugs were suppressed.

In re: B.A.M. 806 A.2d 893 (Pa. Super 2002)
Opinion by Olszewski, J.
The rape statute only applies where there is an age-related predator-prey situation, not to consensual sexual activity with in a peer group.

Defendant was an eleven year-old boy who engaged in a consensual sex act with a boy the same age.

Court held that consensual sex between 2 kids under 13 is NOT rape (under § 3121(a)(6)) (now § 3121( c )) for either of them. The statute only applies where there is an age-related predator-prey situation, not to sexual activity with in a peer group.

In re: S.R. 920 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. 2007)
Opinion by Klein, J.
Child complainant’s statements from her interview with a forensic interview specialist were testimonial, and therefore the admission of those statements violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.

A four-year-old complainant’s statements to her mother were non-testimonial and therefore properly admitted under the Tender Years Statute. Application of the statute was not challenged; the constitutionality of its application was. Her statements from her interview with a forensic interview specialist were testimonial admission of those statements violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.

Complainant broke down and was unable to testify. It is agreed that she was therefore unavailable.

Complainant’s mother questioned the complainant when complainant was simulating sex acts and saying sexually explicit things to her dolls. Mother’s questioning of her daughter was not designed for prosecution, and therefore her statements are non-testimonial.

A forensic interview specialist with the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance (PCA) was contacted by the police to do the interview for the police investigation. She was alone with child, but a police officer watched through one-way glass. During the interview, the specialist took a break to conference with “the team” – the police officer and someone from the Department of Health and Human Services. Although the complainant was allowed to color and play, the interview followed the pattern of court testimony. The Court found that the complainant’s statements to the specialist were carried out under the direction of the police department and for purposes of the investigation and potential prosecution, and thus testimonial.

The test is not how the person questioned views the interrogation, but what the purpose of the statement was as determined by an objective view of the circumstances; whether an objective person, looking at the circumstances of the questioning, would consider the purpose of the statements as aiding the investigation. Was it a statement taken to address an immediate situation and see what is going on or was it a step taken in a police investigation after the action is over for purposes of aiding the investigation and potential prosecution? There is no “child abuse case” exception to Crawford.

Commonwealth v. Layton 307 A.2d 843 (PA 1973)
Opinion by Manderino, J.
An inoperable firearm cannot be a VUFA.

Police came to the scene and disarmed the defendant. Defendant’s pistol was in such a condition that it could not have been fired at the time of his arrest. No evidence was offered to show how the pistol could have been made operable.

However, a firearm is operable even though it is a malfunctioning assembled firearm or a disassembled firearm, if the alleged actor has under his control the means to convert the inoperable firearm into an operable firearm.

In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d 685 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Opinion by Todd, J. Dissenting Opinion by Colville, J.
Vice Principal Of Juvenile’s High School Lacked Reasonable Suspicion Required In Order to Lawfully Search Juvenile’s Purse.

Upon receiving information from a teacher that J.N.Y. had something inappropriate on her, vice principle of high school searched J.N.Y.’s purse and discovered two marijuana pipes. J.N.Y. was adjudicated delinquent based on her possession of drug paraphernalia. She appealed.

The Superior Court held that the juvenile court erred in denying J.N.Y’s suppression motion and adjudicating her delinquent. The court found that the school’s vice principal did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to search J.N.Y.’s purse. Although the juvenile’s teacher claimed to have received information of J.N.Y.’s prohibited items through multiple sources, she was unable to recall the names of the individuals who provided this information.

While outside of the school context, searches must be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law, in schools, the less stringent standard of “reasonable suspicion” applies. The Superior Court found that the vice principal lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to search the juvenile as he could not recall where he received the information regarding J.N.Y’s drug paraphernalia, and he noticed nothing unusual about J.N.Y.’s appearance or speech at any time. Thus, the Superior Court reversed the juvenile court’s adjudication of delinquency.

In the Interest of J.E., 907 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Opinion by Johnson, J. Dissenting Opinion by McCaffery, J.
Juvenile Court Erred in Denying Youth’s Motion to Suppress a Firearm Found Pursuant to Search of Youth Where Probation Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion.

Probation officers arrived at the home of J.E., a minor, to serve an arrest warrant on his brother. J.E.’s stepmother informed the officers that J.E.’s brother was not home, but that J.E. was in his bedroom. The officers searched the home for J.E.’s brother and found J.E. sitting on the edge of his bed. They conducted a pat-down search. One of the probation officers knew that J.E. was on probation and had heard from an unknown informant that J.E. may have been involved in a shooting. He stated that J.E. was very nervous and shaking during the search, raising the officer’s suspicion that J.E. was hiding something. Upon lifting up the mattress where J.E. had been sitting, the officer found a gun. J.E. was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm by a minor and possession of a firearm without a license. The trial court denied J.E.’s motion to suppress the gun and adjudicated J.E. delinquent. J.E. appealed.

The Superior Court reversed the delinquency adjudication, finding that the trial court erred in denying J.E.’s motion to suppress the gun. First, the court held that the protective sweep doctrine was inapplicable in this case because the doctrine only applies to searches incident to an arrest; in this case the officers did not effectuate an arrest of J.E.’s brother. Second, the probation officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the search. The fact that J.E. was shaking during the pat-down search did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a violation of probation prior to the search. And, the court was unable to determine whether the information from an informant regarding J.E.’s possible involvement in a shooting was credible because the probation officer did not identify the source of the tip or demonstrate the reliability of the tip. Third, the probation officers had to have reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to search J.E. even though J.E. had signed a consent decree allowing probation officers to conduct warrantless searches as a term of his probation. The majority rejected the dissent’s reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006), for the proposition that juvenile probationers receive no protection from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.

In his dissent, Judge McCaffery concluded that under Pennsylvania statutory law, the probation officer had reasonable grounds to search J.E. He reasoned that the protective sweep doctrine is not limited to those instances in which officers are actually engaged in an arrest. The majority held that unlike the California statute at issue in Samson, Pennsylvania statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6304, mandates that officers possess reasonable suspicion that a child has violated the conditions of supervision before conducting a search even where the child has signed a form consenting to searches. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6304(a.1)(2) acknowledges that federal and state constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures trump the statute’s authorization for searches.

In the interest of S.J., 713 A.2d 45, (PA 1998)
Opinion by Nigro, J., Cappy, J concurs and dissents, Castille, J., dissents, and Newman, J., joins
In order to justify a protective frisk, the officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe that suspect is armed and dangerous.

While on patrol in a high crime area, an officer noticed a group of 12 males standing on a street corner. As he passed the corner, the officer detected the odor of marijuana. He drove around and observed several of the juveniles smoking marijuana. As he exited his patrol car, the officer noticed S.J. trying to “worm himself” to the front of the group so that he would not be noticed. The group dispersed, and the officer stopped S.J. as he attempted to depart. After stopping S.J., the officer patted him down and felt a hard, chunky substance he immediately knew to be cocaine. The officer then reached into S.J.’s pockets and removed 36 baggies of crack cocaine.

The trial court denied S.J.’s suppression motion, and he was later adjudicated delinquent for PWID. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of S.J.’s suppression motion. The Supreme Court held that the investigatory stop was justified, but the subsequent pat down of S.J. was unjustified.

The Supreme Court reasoned that this was an investigatory detention as opposed to a mere encounter, but that this was justified because the officer observed unusual conduct which lead him to reasonably conclude, based on his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. However, in order to justify a protective frisk, the officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe that suspect is armed and dangerous. The officer’s statement that he patted down S.J. for his safety does not rise to the level of particularized or reasonable suspicion for a pat down, where there was no testimony of furtive movements or testimony that S.J.’s clothing had an “unusual bulges.”

In re J.V., 762 A.2d 376, (Pa.Super. 2000)
Opinion by Cavanaugh, J.
A protective pat down of the juvenile based on his mere presence during the execution of the drug warrant is unjustified.

Six police officers entered a two-story residence to execute a search warrant for drugs. The final officer to enter the building had the task of securing the living room area of the first floor. J.V. was present in the home and was asleep on the couch in the living room at the time the officers entered. J.V. was neither a resident of the house nor a target of the search warrant. J.V. did not appear to be dangerous and was not a threat, but officer woke him up and ordered him to stand so that he could perform a weapons pat down for officer safety. As the officer frisked J.V., he felt a wad of money and a pager, but did not retrieve these items. In J.V.’s sock, he felt he felt 3 hard, chunky objects and felt a plastic bag contained a chalky substance he believed to be crack cocaine. He subsequently removed 2 bags of crack cocaine and a brown paper bag containing an additional baggie of crack cocaine from J.V.’s person. The crack cocaine’s total weight was 12.99 grams. J.V. was subsequently charged with PWID. J.V. made a motion to suppress the evidence, which was denied by trial court. He was found involved and adjudicated delinquent on the charge.

The Superior Court reversed, holding that the protective pat down of the juvenile based on his mere presence during the execution of the drug warrant was unjustified. The Court reasoned that a Terry stop was unjustified because the officer did not have reasonable belief that J.V. was armed and dangerous.

Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 342 (PA 2001)
Opinion by Saylor, J. Concurring Opinion by Nigro, J.
Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove Defendant’s self-defense claim.

After complainant runs out of a house holding his head and complaining of being hit with a wrench, Torres is charged with simple assault. Complainant does not appear for the bench trial, but trial court allows his statements into evidence under the excited utterance exception. Torres testifies that he acted in self-defense when he punched Complainant. Trial Judge found Torres guilty of simple assault.

Torres appeals, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that the Commonwealth failed to disprove his claim of self-defense. The Superior Court affirmed.

The Supreme Court held that because the Commonwealth failed to disprove Torres’ self-defense claim that the conviction must be overturned. When a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. While the defendant does not have a burden to prove the claim of self-defense, before the defense is at issue at trial, there must be some evidence to justify a finding of self-defense (see 18 Pa.C.S.A. §505(a)).

In the Interest of J.L., 475 A.2d 156 (Pa. Super. 1984)
Opinion by Wieand, J.
Fights between juvenile family members are not usually criminal.

J.L., a 16-year-old girl, was adjudicated delinquent after the trial court found her guilty of simple assault when she hit her 2-year-old nephew with her elbow and pushed him while they sat next to each other on the couch in the home in which they both resided. The child did not sustain bodily injury as a result of the contact, nor did he cry or fall from the couch.

The Superior Court held that evidence was insufficient to permit reasonable inference that J.L.’s act of pushing the child with her elbow was done with the intent to injure the child or cause substantial pain, thus the evidence was insufficient to support an adjudication for simple assault. While the Superior Court recognized that it is not essential to a conviction for simple assault that a victim sustain actual injury so long as the actor attempted to inflict bodily injury, in this case the evidence did not allow for a reasonable inference that J.L.’s act of pushing the child away with her elbow was intended to injure him or cause him substantial pain. Further, to show an attempt to inflict bodily injury, Commonwealth must show that actor had a specific intent to cause bodily injury.

Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943 (PA 1999)
Opinion by Saylor, J., Dissenting Opinion by Castille, J.
Single profane comment to police when no one else is present is not disorderly conduct.

After a police officer observed Hock driving into the parking lot of her apartment building when he knew she had a suspended license, he pulled his police cruiser aside of her and requested that she produce her driver’s license. After Hock refused to produce her license and protested to the police officer that she was a victim of frequent police harassment, the officer then told her that she would be receiving a citation in the mail for driving without a license for driving with a suspended license. As Hock walked away from the vehicle, she said “Fuck you, asshole,” in a normal tone of voice to the officer and no one else was present.

She was then cited for disorderly conduct. As the police officer placed handcuffs on her, Hock rolled up into a ball and kicked at the officer several times. She was subsequently charged with resisting arrest.

The trial court dismissed all charges. The Superior Court reversed and remanded, focusing on the “fighting words.” The Superior Court found that because the profanity was uttered in a public place, any untoward reaction by the police officer would have affected anyone who happened by the area.

The Supreme Court held that a single profane remark made to a police officer did not provide a sufficient basis to arrest her for the offense of disorderly conduct when only Hock and the police officer were present and Hock’s behavior was neither threatening nor violent. Furthermore, Hock had not raised her voice to the officer and she neither intended to cause nor recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. Her words were not “fighting words” as the circumstances surrounding the words did not indicate a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by others. Finally, the court opined that “…the offense of disorderly conduct is not intended as catchall for every act which annoys or disturbs people; it is not used as a dragnet for all the irritations which breed in the ferment of a community.”

Also, because the initial arrest for disorderly conduct was not valid, the charge of resisting arrest cannot stand either. A valid charge of resisting arrest requires an underlying lawful arrest, which in turn requires that the arresting officer possess probable cause. Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492, 497 (1955).

Commonwealth v. Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128 (PA 1995)
Opinion by Cappy, J., Dissent by Castille, J.
Search of passenger in automobile not proper where passenger was not arrested and did not exhibit unusual or suspicious conduct.

Shiflet was a passenger in an automobile where the driver was stopped and subsequently arrested for DUI and another passenger was arrested for disorderly conduct. Shiflet was not arrested. Because Shiflet did not possess a valid driver’s license, the trooper offered to drive her to the police barracks and she accepted. Without asking for permission, the trooper seized Shiflet’s purse and began to search through its contents. The trooper found a small leather pouch with a small amount of marijuana and three marijuana pipes inside. Shiflet was charged with possession of a small amount of marijuana and paraphernalia.

Shiflet’s motion to suppress was denied after a hearing. She was found guilty after a jury trial. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the search incident to arrest exception did not justify a warrantless search of the passenger’s purse and the search of the purse was too attenuated to be incident to arrest of motorist and other passenger. The Court reasoned that the most glaring weakness in the Commonwealth’s argument is that there simply had not been an arrest of Shiflet in this case; a lawful arrest is a precondition to the search.

The Court also rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that the search incident to lawful arrest extends to others in the vicinity of the arrestee. The Court discussed the automatic companion rule, which states that all companions of an arrestee within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing an assault on the officer a subject to a cursory pat-down search. While the Court decided to “reserve the question for another day” as to whether the automatic companion rule applies in PA, it did note that given the fact of this case, there was no basis for the search of Shiflet, as the Commonwealth did not argue that the trooper observed unusual or suspicious conduct on behalf of Shiflet.

In re R.A., 744 A.2d 1261 (PA 2000)
Opinion by Nigro, J. Newman, J., concurred and dissented. Dissent by Castille, J.
Plain feel exception to the warrant requirement not satisfied because criminal nature of a cigar and pill bottle was not immediately apparent to trooper.

R.A. was sitting in the back seat of an automobile which had been stopped by police because of a cracked windshield. After stopping the car at a service station, the driver of the car started to walk from the car, and the trooper ordered him to return to the car and patted him down for weapons, but found nothing. While patting down the driver, the trooper ordered R.A. and the other passenger to keep their hands up. Because R.A. appeared nervous and made suspicious movements, the trooper patted him down. During the pat down, the trooper felt what appeared to be a cigar and a pill bottle in the liner of R.A.’s jacket. After removing the items, the trooper noticed that the cigar contained marijuana and the pill bottle contained crack cocaine. R.A. was charge with possession of small amount of marijuana and possession with intent to deliver cocaine.

The trial court denied R.A.’s motion to suppress the drugs, finding that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop and frisk and that the cigar and pill bottle were properly seized under the plain feel exception to the warrant requirement and R.A. was adjudicated delinquent. The Superior Court affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court held that the plain feel doctrine did not justify seizure of drugs during Terry frisks when the trooper did not testify that he felt the contents of the object or that it was immediately apparent to him that what he was feeling was contraband.

The Court reasoned that since the justification for a Terry frisk for weapons is the protection of the officer or others nearby, such a search must be limited to that which is necessary to for the discovery of weapons. The plain feel doctrine is applicable only when during the Terry frisk the officer feels an item whose mass or contour makes its criminal character immediately apparent. “Immediately apparent” means that the officer readily perceives what he is feeling is contraband, without exploration or searching.
The immediately apparent requirement of the plain feel doctrine is not met when an officer conducting a Terry frisk merely feels and recognizes an object by touch that could be used to hold either legal or illegal substances, even when the officer has previously seen others use that object to hold or carry illegal drugs. Pill bottles or cigars are not by their very nature contraband, and since their contents were detected only after the trooper seized and inspected the cigar and pill bottle by sight, thus the immediately apparent requirement of the plain feel exception was not met.

In the Interest of A.B., No. 2149 EDA 2006 (Pa. Super. 2007)
Opinion by McEwen, J.
Juvenile entitled to expungement of records.

A.B. was adjudicated delinquent in 1999 for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, an ungraded felony. In 2006, A.B. filed a petition to expunge. After a hearing was held, the trial court denied A.B.’s petition. A.B. appealed, claiming that the trial court erred because he had fulfilled all the statutory requirements entitling him to an expungement. The Superior Court reversed and remanded.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §9123(a) controls on the issue of expungement of juvenile records. It lists 4 separate grounds for expungement, including, 1. when the complaint is dismissed, 2. if 6 months have elapsed since the final discharge from a consent decree, 3. if 5 years have passed since the final discharge from commitment, placement or other disposition and the person has not been convicted of a misdemeanor or felony or adjudicated delinquent in another matter, or 4. the individual is 18 years old, the Commonwealth agrees to expungement and the court orders expungement after considering several enumerated factors.

Here, the Superior Court notes that the petitioner need not satisfy all of the itemized conditions, rather he or she is entitled to expungement if only one of the factors are satisfied.

Under the statutory intent of the Criminal History Record Information Act [C.H.I.R.A.], the purpose of said act is to provide an opportunity for children to leave behind the damaging effect of a record, and the Act defined situations where the General Assembly determined that juvenile offenders were entitled to a second chance at a life free from the anchor of a youthful mistake.

In the Interest of Dublinski, 695 A.2d 897 (PA Super. 1997)
Opinion by Tamilia, J.
Restitution Order must comply with factors in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §6352.

Dublinski was arrested for and admitted to two counts of burglary and one count of criminal trespass when she and a group of juveniles entered and vandalized various homes, causing $153,000 in damage. Dublinski was adjudicated delinquent on the charges and the trial judge ordered her to pay $10,000 in restitution. Dublinski appealed the order of restitution only as to the share she was required to pay, not to the total amount of damage.

The Superior Court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by arbitrarily ordering $10,000 restitution because it did not consider the factors in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §6352. Section 6352 illustrates that a trial court must consider the proportion of the damage caused by that juvenile, her ability to pay, or manner in which she should make restitution. The trial court must consider the amount of loss suffered by victim, the extent to which juvenile’s action caused such injury, whether the amount exceeds juvenile’s ability to pay, and type of payment that will best serve the needs of the victim and capabilities of the juvenile. Here, the trial court was incorrect because it arbitrarily ordered an amount of $10,000 without considering these factors.

Pennsylvania Juvenile Defenders

Northeast Regional Defender Center

Helpful Links

State and Local Defender Sites

Delaware

New Jersey

New York

Pennsylvania

Essential Case Law